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I.  Introduction
In line with the historic June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration, South and North
Korea signed four major agreements on inter-Korean economic cooperation in
December 2000. Their adoption was a critical milestone in economic cooperation as
it formalized and institutionalized economic cooperation. Inter-Korean cooperation
has evolved from off again, on again trial efforts at actual trade projects that are
expanding both quantitatively and qualitatively. With the agreements in place,
businesses involved in inter-Korean economic cooperation can now enjoy real
benefits. 
Despite their adoption, however, economic cooperation has not grown to the
degree expected. A major reason for the lackluster performance is the nature of the
agreements: they consist mainly of generalized, abstract legal regulations, and lack
necessary measures for implementation. So, while the agreements were a positive
rite of passage for inter-Korean economic cooperation, they will not smooth the way
toward economic cooperation. 
Nonetheless, the agreements have certainly provided some stability to economic
cooperation between South and North Korea. In this respect, it is high time that we
identify inherent issues in the four agreements on inter-Korean economic
cooperation and introduce appropriate follow-up measures. Some agreements may
be impossible to implement on their own, and for these, supplementary measures
must be adopted immediately. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify and propose follow-up measures that the
South Korean government should introduce to support the four major agreements on
inter-Korean economic cooperation. To this end, the legal and institutional
significance and the key points of the agreements will be reviewed, and follow-up
measures will be proposed necessary for further economic cooperation between the
two Koreas.  
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Abstract
This paper argues that the adoption of the four major inter-Korean agreements on economic
cooperation shows that barriers to inter-Korean cooperation and building an inter-Korean economic
union can be overcome through dialog and cooperation. Faithful implementation and observance of
these agreements is expected to stimulate inter-Korean economic cooperation and push forward the
implementation of other agreements made between the two Koreas. However, many areas in the Four
Major Agreements are incomplete. Thus, there must be clarification through measures or even
deletions of ambiguous clauses that could block implementation. At the same time, specific and
actionable follow-up measures need to be introduced to ensure implementation. 
B. Adoption of the Four Agreements 
Article 4 of the South-North Joint Declaration stipulates “promoting balanced
development of the national economy through economic cooperation.” Two rounds
of working-level talks were held to establish an institutional mechanism for
economic exchange and cooperation (Seoul in September 2000; and Pyongyang in
November 2000). On November 11, 2000, the two Koreas adopted and tentatively
signed four major agreements on inter-Korean economic cooperation (hereafter the
Four Major Agreements): the Agreement on Investment Protection between the
South and the North; the Agreement on Clearing Settlement between the South and
the North; the Agreement on Prevention of Double Taxation of Income between the
South and the North; and the Agreement on Procedures for Resolution of
Commercial Disputes between the South and the North. 
At the 4th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks held in Pyongyang on December 16,
2000, chief delegates from the two Koreas formally signed the four agreements.
However, introducing follow-up measures to provide a legal basis for the four
agreements was a challenge. Progress was slowed by differences between various
South Korean government agencies, not to mention between the two Koreas. After
little progress, the South Korean government finally decided to treat the agreements
as treaties. After heated discussion at the South Korean National Assembly, they
were finally ratified on June 30, 2003. Meanwhile, the four agreements appear to
have been approved by the Presidium of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly
on July 24, 2003.2) After written copies of the agreements were exchanged at
Panmunjom on August 20, they officially took effect. 
C. Legal and Economic Significance of the Four Major Agreements
What is noteworthy about the Four Major Agreements is that the South Korean
government, for the first time, considered them as “treaties” in order to give them
legal status. This new approach becomes clear when the agreements are compared
with another agreement: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and
Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea (Basic Agreement)
2) Ministry of Unification, “Status Report” (the report submitted for the 2003 National Assembly’s inspection
of government offices), p. 49.
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II.  The Adoption of The Four Economic Cooperation Agreements: 
Legal and Institutional Significance 
A. Inter-Korean Agreements after the 2000 Summit
The Inter-Korean Summit of June 2000, the first since the division of the two
Koreas a half-century ago, was a critical turning point in upgrading relations
between the two Koreas. The South-North Joint Declaration announced at the end of
the summit established the framework for reconciliation and cooperation between
the two Koreas. 
Article 4 of the Joint Declaration was aimed at stimulating cooperation and
exchanges in civic, cultural, sports, public health, environment and other fields.
Based on this agreement, there have been various efforts to implement the
framework, and to realize the spirit of the Joint Declaration. Examples include
reconnection of the Seoul-Shinuiju Railway, construction of the Gaesong Industrial
Complex, and the Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project, all aimed at expanding and
stimulating economic cooperation between the South and the North. So far, various
agreements regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation have been adopted to
provide legal and institutional support for economic cooperation between the two
Koreas. In particular, the four agreements serve as the framework for formalizing
and institutionalizing the formation of a national economic union. 
Since the Inter-Korean Summit, and up to the end of August 2004, a total of 47
agreements have been reached in relation to economic cooperation.1) Agreement
documents are labeled under various terms: “agreement,” “tentative agreement,”
“accord” or “joint press release,” but regardless of the names, they are all aimed at
implementing the Joint Declaration, and in particular, stimulating inter-Korean
economic cooperation. Specifically, the term “agreement” (including basic
agreement and annex agreement) was used in twenty-eight documents, “accord” in
seven, and “joint press release” in twelve. 
1) Joint press releases at the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks may
also be directly or indirectly related, but were excluded when counting the number of agreements. Also, appendices
of agreements were excluded.
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extraordinary situation of South and North Korea and their significantly different
systems vis-à-vis international practices, setting the stage for future agreements
between the two Koreas. 
III.  Legal and Institutional Follow- Up Measures
A. Additional Legal Implementation after the Four Major Agreements
Consent by the National Assembly is required to give legal validity to inter-
Korean agreements related to the people’s rights and duties (Article 6 and Article 60
of the Constitution).5) The announcement of the 1992 Basic Agreement was followed
by various agreements on military and economic affairs, but the agreements
themselves were not ratified according to domestic law. The South Korean
government, as well as the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, simply
considered them as gentlemen’s agreements. 
However, the four agreements on inter-Korean economic cooperation signed in
December 2000 were treated differently. If they were not treated as “treaties” (i.e.,
legally guaranteed as South Korean domestic laws), it would be impossible to
provide legal rights or benefits to South Korean businesses operating in the North. 
Through consultations with the North, the South Korean government decided to
recognize them as treaties and in June 2003, moved to seek parliamentary consent.6)
It should be noted that although the Four Major Agreements were recognized as
5) The Constitution of Korea, Article 6-(1): “Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution
and generally recognized rules of international law have the same effect as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.”
Article 60-(1) “The National Assembly has the right to consent to the conclusion and ratification of treaties
pertaining to mutual assistance or mutual security; treaties concerning important international organizations; treaties
of friendship, trade and navigation; treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty; peace treaties; treaties which
will burden the State or people with an important financial obligation; and treaties related to legislative matters.”
6) The four agreements on inter-Korean economic cooperation were jointly submitted by the Ministry of
Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and approved by the National Assembly, as in June 2003
when the agreement was established a government agency was not appointed to oversee the agreements with the
North. Therefore the agreements were jointly submitted by the Ministry of Unification, involved in forming
agreements with North Korea and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, governing the signing of international
treaties.
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signed in 1992. After signing the Basic Agreement, the South Korean government
did not obtain consent from the National Assembly. Also, considering the Basic
Agreement as a type of a joint declaration or a gentlemen’s agreement, the
Constitutional Court did not recognize its legal validity. Therefore, the government’s
approach to the four agreements differs from that in the past. 
The different approach led to questions as to whether the Four Major Agreements
can be regarded as treaties, as defined in Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Korea, and if they can be treated as treaties, whether (1)
parliamentary approval, as stipulated in the Constitution, is required, and (2) whether
a treaty between South and North Korea violates Article 3 (on territory) of the
Constitution. After considering various aspects of the matter the government finally
decided to treat the Four Major Agreements as treaties (“special treaty,” type 1 of the
treaties stipulated in Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Constitution).3) Such a decision
was epochal, especially from a legal point of view, as it meant that at least on
economic cooperation, inter-Korean relations would now be recognized within a
legal and institutional framework.4)
Meanwhile, the adoption of the Four Major Agreements is meaningful as the first
example of an institutional framework on inter-Korean economic cooperation that
had been agreed to between the two Koreas through consultations. Even prior to the
agreements, South and North Korea had concurred on the principles of economic
cooperation but had not introduced an institutional mechanism jointly governed by
the two Koreas. Therefore, the Four Major Agreements are the first concrete attempt
to overcome fixed ideas and approaches to inter-Korean economic cooperation. 
In addition, the four agreements provide an institutional mechanism to support
inter-Korean economic cooperation in the private sector, which is already underway,
bolstering those efforts. 
Furthermore, they provide a stable framework that takes into account the
3) The premise for this is to identify the legal nature of inter-Korean relations and determine whether North
Korea can be recognized as having the ability to sign a treaty. The South Korean government, according to
international law, does not recognize North Korea as a nation, but as a political entity constituting one part of a
divided nation. In relation to an inter-Korean treaty, the South Korean government appears to have taken the position
that it recognizes North Korea as being eligible to sign a treaty.
4) Jhe Seong Ho, “Legal validity of inter-Korean agreement in South Korea: In view of a treaty recognized by
international law and considering its relations to the Constitution of Korea”, Beopjo, Vol. 53-4 (No. 571) April 2004.
pp. 79-85
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the uncertainties associated with investing in North Korea, and lay the foundation
for stable investment. Currently North Korea is not a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or any other international organization or agreement
related to promoting or protecting investment or settling disputes. To mitigate this
risk, the Agreement protects South Korean investments (principals and profits),
guarantees lost remittances, enables compensation for nationalization and
expropriation and offers a mechanism for settlement of disputes, thus making it
possible for South Korea to work outside the domestic laws of North Korea.9) The
Agreement on Investment Protection went into effect immediately, without
implementation of any other measures, once written copies of the agreement were
exchanged between the governments of South and North Korea. 
Despite the Agreement, investing in North Korea entails significant political
risks. It is still possible for North Korea to carry out disguised or creeping
nationalization.10) Therefore, the Agreement should be revised and amended to
include various measures against excessively heavy taxation equivalent to
confiscation, and forced sell-offs of shares or other measures that could have the
same impact as an expropriation or nationalization. Such revisions would prevent
North Korea from taking arbitrary actions.11) Measures should also protect
investment by restricting expropriation or nationalization for a set period after
investments are made. 
Furthermore, it is desirable to include in the Agreement on Investment
Protection, provisions on employment protection of foreign workers, guarantee of
various commercial activities, protection of advanced investment and continuance
the investing country or investors. Lee Sang-Hoon, “Legal Aspects of the Agreement on Inter-Korean Economic
Cooperation”, Beopje, No. 552 (December 2003), p. 68.
9) Full text of the agreement in English is posted at [http://www.unikorea.go.kr/ en /library/
library.php?page_code=ue0501&ucd=eng0204&ewn_num=64&mode=view&ispr=1].
10) ‘Creeping nationalization’ refers to a situation in which discriminatory regulations are applied to a foreign
investor to weaken business performance and ultimately make the investor give up the business. Earl Snyder,
“Protection of Private Foreign Investment: Examination and Appraisal”, International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, Vol. 10 (1961), p. 472.
11) Martin Domke, “Foreign Nationalization: Some Aspects of Contemporary International Law”, Selected
Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments (New York: Matthew Bender & Co., 1973), p. 310.
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treaties, they are different from other general treaties established with sovereign
nations and should be regarded as special treaties “recognizing that their
relationship, not being like a relationship between states, is a special one instituted
as a temporary measure in the process of unification.”(Preamble of the 1992 Basic
Agreement) 
Following the adoption of the Four Major Agreements, others requiring legal
validation under South Korean domestic law were established. Examples include,
the Agreement on Motor Vehicle Operations (adopted on December 6, 2002), the
Agreement on Customs Clearance at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (adopted on
December 8, 2002), the Agreement on Quarantine (adopted on December 8,
2002), the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Commercial
Arbitration Commission (adopted on October 12, 2003), and the Agreement on
Entry/ Departure Procedures and Duration of Stay in Kaesong Industrial Complex
and Mt. Kumgang (adopted on January 29, 2004). Recognizing the need to
validate the above five agreements, the South Korean government completed the
examination by the Ministry of Legislation (July 15, 2004), held a deputy
ministerial meeting (July 22), obtained a Cabinet Council resolution (July 27),
obtained presidential approval (August 3), forwarded the proposal to the National
Assembly (August 5), and within a short period, these inter-Korean agreements
would become effective under domestic law.7)
B. Follow-up Measures to the Agreement on Investment Protection 
The contents of the Agreement on Investment Protection between South and
North Korea are similar to investment protection agreements normally signed
between states.8) By adopting the agreement the two Koreas were able to remove
7) The Agreement on Telecommunications at Gaeseong Industrial Complex, the Inter-Korean Marine
Transportation Agreement, and the Annex Agreement Inter-Korean Marine Transportation, which were examined
by the Ministry of Government Legislation and the Agreement on Train Operation reached on July 30, 2004, and
was forwarded to the National Assembly in early September.
8) Normally, the purpose of establishing an investment protection agreement is to establish a legal mechanism
that protects investors from non-commercial risks by protecting investment between the two nations entering the
agreement. Non-commercial risks include nationalization and expropriation by the government attracting
investment, investment loss resulting from armed conflict, restrictions on overseas remittance, and sterilization.
Investment protection agreements only stipulate the obligations of the country attracting investment and not those of
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settlements through clearing settlement banks designated by the South and the
North, without having to go through a third-party bank. Also, as businesses
supplying goods to the North can now collect payments immediately through the
Clearing Settlement Banks, collection risks have been significantly reduced and
inter-Korean trade is expected to grow at a faster pace. 
The original Clearing Settlement Agreement merely defined the basic principles,
which made it necessary to later agree on the details. In order to complement the
agreement, the two Koreas produced the 2004 Agreement on Clearing Settlement
between the South and the North, and tentatively signed it at the Third Meeting of
the Working-Level Talks for Inter-Korean Clearing Settlement, held on April 20-
22, 2004 (As of August 31, 2004 this agreement has not been formally signed). A
more specific institutional mechanism for clearing settlement between the South
and the North has been established with the adoption of the above Agreement, but
many issues still need to be resolved between the two Koreas, with matters
examined more thoroughly and additional follow-up agreements reached. 
Most importantly, the two Koreas have agreed to apply clearing settlement to
goods that originate from the South or the North (commissioned processing
excluded) and will agree on the scope of application later, through exchange of
documents. In defining the scope of the clearing settlement, it is likely that the
positive-list approach will be used first, moving to the negative list afterwards. 
Setting a credit line could be based on quantity, value or a combination of both.
At present, the two Koreas have agreed to set a credit line based on value, but once
clearing settlement becomes widespread, a combination of methods would be
preferable. In any case, the transaction price must be decided between the
contracting  parties based on international market prices.14)
Three preliminary steps are necessary to enable clearing settlement: a system
between clearing settlement banks to enable mutual recognition and settlement
must be established, a settlement network such as SWIFT must be connected and a
cooperation system for currency transaction agreements must be implemented.15)
Article 7 of the Clearing Settlement Agreement stipulates that the clearing
14) Ryu Seung Ho, “The Effect of Introducing a Clearing Settlement Mechanism between the South and the
North”, p. 48.
15) Ibid, p. 52
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of the effect of the agreement.12) In regard to settling investment disputes, third-
party intervention and review by the ICSID Convention should be options. 
Since North Korea’s legal regulations on attracting foreign investment are
neither specific, nor transparent, the South Korean government should consult
closely with businesses who want to establish investment contracts with the North.
In particular, it should develop a model for inter-Korean joint investment contracts
that can be used by businesses to ensure profitability. In this respect, it is important
to include in the Agreement provisions on settlement of disputes and force
majeure. Furthermore, it may also be worthwhile to consider introducing
guidelines on investment-dispute settlement, which can be applied to any dispute
arising between the two Koreas. 
With the Agreement on Investment Protection in force, now is the time to
introduce a loss coverage program against non-commercial risks, as defined in
Article 5 of the Provision on the Employment and Management of the Inter-
Korean Cooperation Fund (In May 2004, the South Korean government
introduced a loss coverage program by amending the Enforcement Rule of the Act
on Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund). Through consultations with the North, a
method to identify losses incurred through non-commercial factors should be
determined, and detailed regulations and provisions adopted. In addition,
regulations should be amended so as to recognize investment assets in North
Korea as collateral for loans from the inter-Korean cooperation fund, while
seeking to exchange information on laws governing investment and taxation. 
C. Follow-up Measures to the Agreement on Clearing Settlement
The Agreement on Clearing Settlement between the South and the North13)
enables South Korean businesses to save time and money by directly making
12) That is, to keep an agreement in force on investments made prior to the termination of the agreement. Jhe
Seong-Ho, “Protection of North Korean Investment and Settlement of Disputes”, Research Report 93-09 (Seoul:
Korea Institute for National Unification, 1993), p. 97-136; Moon Joon Jo, “Investment Protection between South
and North Korea”, Ministry of Unification, “1994 Comprehensive Expert Review on Economic Exchange and
Cooperation”, Preliminary Summit Material, 94-12-60 (Seoul: Secretariate for Inter-Korean Summit, Ministry of
Unification, 1994) p.21-44.
13) See URL: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/library/library.php?page_code=ue0501&ucd=eng0204&ewn_num
=63&mode=view&ispr=1.
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based on free trade. Since Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund prohibits government intervention in currency
payments for goods or services, clearing settlement can be in conflict with the IMF
Articles of Agreement. At present, South and North Korea are treating inter-
Korean trade as internal transactions within a nation, which is not subject to
international regulations, but in the long term it will be necessary to secure
concordance between the special characteristics of inter-Korean trade within the
framework of international regulations. Therefore, once trade between the two
Koreas stabilizes, efforts should be made to reduce clearing settlement while
gradually introducing common settlement schemes.17)
D. Follow-up Measures to the Agreement on Procedures to Resolve 
Inter-Korean Commercial Disputes18)
In the course of inter-Korean economic cooperation, one of the main concerns
of an investor will be resolving disputes, i.e., how, by whom, and under which
laws. Recently, disputes arising from international trade or investment have been
resolved through commercial arbitration rather than litigation; therefore, with the
agreement on procedures to resolve inter-Korean commercial disputes, the two
Koreas have established the basic foundation for expanded economic cooperation. 
The most urgent follow-up measure needed to support the Agreement is
organizing an inter-Korean commercial arbitration commission, and establishing
relevant internal regulations. Also, a list of arbitrators must be exchanged and, in
the mid-and long-term, efforts should be made to encourage North Korea to join
the International Arbitration Agreement. The following are some follow-up
measures that should be taken: 
1. Formation of an Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration Commission 
According to Paragraph 1, Article 2 of the Agreement on the Formation and
17) Ryu Seung Ho, “The Effect of Introducing a Clearing Settlement Mechanism between the South and the
North”, p. 54.
18) See URL: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/library/library.php?page_code= ue0501&ucd= eng0204&ewn_
num=65&mode=view&ispr=1].
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settlement banks designated by the South and the North, respectively, shall by
mutual agreement determine the settlement procedures and methods for
implementing the Agreement, but such an agreement is yet to be reached, which
means that clearing settlement between banks is currently on hold. The clearing
settlement banks designated by the South and the North should expedite a final
agreement on settlement procedures and methods, including the scope of the
clearing settlement, the clearing settlement period, cost coverage, refusal of
payment, and calculation of interest, so that the Agreement can be formally
signed.16)
Meanwhile, special efforts to balance clearing settlement with existing inter-
Korean trade practices should be made to ensure successful implementation of
inter-Korean clearing settlement. In the early 1990s, when the idea of introducing
clearing settlement was first discussed, adopting such a mechanism did not seem
to be a problem since trade between the two Koreas was insignificant. Now,
however, with increased trade, at a much larger scale, trade practices are already
firmly in place. Therefore, it is critical to identify ways to balance the newly
introduced clearing settlement with existing trade practices, and this necessitates
collecting the views of relevant industries while setting up a mechanism for
arbitration. 
In addition, clearing settlement should be focused on creating trade. Instead of
trying to replace existing transactions, clearing settlement should be aimed at
creating new demand to increase trade volume while minimizing impact on
existing transactions. New demands should be generated in areas such as resource
development which have the potential for increased trade. 
In practice, clearing settlement, which is a special form of controlled trade, is in
some ways inappropriate for recent trends in global economic development mainly
16) At the third meeting of the working-level council for inter-Korean clearing settlement, held from April 20 to
22, 2004, the Clearing Settlement Banks came close to reaching an agreement on the scope, period and cost
coverage but decided to continue discussions on refusal of payment and calculation of interest. Ministry of
Unification, “Press Release at the Third Meeting of the Working-level Council for Inter-Korean Clearing
Settlement”, April 22, 2004. A consensus on overall procedures and methods for clearing settlement, including
interest rates, work flow, processes and entry into force, is said to have been reached later between the Clearing
Settlement Banks at a working-level contact meeting, but specific details have not been disclosed. “The Export-
Import Bank of Korea and Chosun Trade Bank reach an agreement on inter-Korean clearing settlement: the
agreement to enter into force once formally signed by the South and the North”, Yonhap News, June 27, 2004.
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Therefore, the Agreement should be amended to include a clause stating that if the
chairmen fail to reach a consensus on the venue, the meetings would be held at a
certain location, for instance Panmunjom. 
3. Cancellation of the Arbitration Commission
Article 8 of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Commercial
Arbitration Commission states that canceling an arbitration decision requires a
consensus, and it stipulates that a request for cancellation will be dismissed if a
consensus is not reached. Based on such a regulation it is doubtful whether an
existing arbitration decision can be cancelled by consensus as it is unlikely that the
opposing parties from the South and the North (in other words, one party in favor
of the arbitration decision and the other party against the decision) will easily
come to an agreement. Further, if such an agreement can be reached, serious
questions can be raised about whether Clause 2 (initiation of a new arbitration
process) of Article 8 is necessary. If the intention is truly to enable a decision to be
cancelled, the Agreement should instruct a request to be made to an international
arbitration court. 
4. Operation and Secretariat of the Arbitration Commission 
Article 9 of the Agreement guarantees (1) the activities of the commission, (2)
the security of the chairmen and members of the commission and other relevant
people, (3) immunity of the commission and its assets, (4) immunity of the
chairmen and members of the commission and other relevant people, (5)
attendance of the parties concerned, proxies, witnesses, and appraisers. 
Article 10 of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Commercial
Arbitration Commission stipulates (1) the designation of a secretariat for
arbitration affairs, (2) its role, (3) non-violation of the secretariat’s documents. The
“secretariat for arbitration affairs” refers to an organization that preserves and
holds various documents such as arbitrators list, qualifications of the arbitrator and
original copies of arbitration decisions. Following this provision, the South Korean
government should take legal steps as soon as possible to designate a secretariat
for arbitration affairs. Once an arbitration commission for South Korea is
organized, it is likely that the commission will (through close consultations with
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Operation of a Commercial Arbitration Commission, the chairman and members
of the commission from the South Korean side are to be selected through
consultations with relevant agencies. The agencies likely to be involved in the
selection process are the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Justice, the
National Intelligence Service, and the Secretariat of the National Security Council. 
Then, based on Paragraph 4, Article 14, the South Korean government is
required to follow up the Agreement by organizing a South Korean arbitration
commission immediately. For this, a decision has to be made whether that
commission will consist only of government officials or include civilian experts.
Such questions are critical legal and policy decisions the South Korean
government must make to stimulate inter-Korean economic cooperation. Citing an
example, the joint representative scheme stipulated in Clause 3, Article 2 of the
Agreement is based on the assumption that the respective committee chairmen
from both sides reach a consensus. Consequently, if the chairmen fail to reach a
consensus, the arbitration commission could be powerless to act. The Agreement
should therefore be amended to include a provision to prevent this from occurring. 
2. Operational Procedures and Venue for the Arbitration Commission 
Article 5 of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of a Commercial
Arbitration Commission outlines the operation of the commission and basically
stresses that operation shall be based on mutual consent between the two Koreas.
Therefore, as a follow-up measure to the Agreement, the South Korean
government should work with the North to agree on matters concerning operation
of the commission. 
Nonetheless, what happens if South and North Korea fail to reach an
agreement? After all, it is unrealistic to expect that the two Koreas will iron out
their differences on every issue. Once the commission actually begins operating, it
is most important to anticipate such events. In particular, Agreement provisions
are sometimes confusing: While a commission meeting requires a consensus,
ruling on a case requires a majority (Article 13). Incongruities like this must be
amended.
Article 6 of the Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the Commercial
Arbitration Commission calls for chairmen of both parties to agree on the venue
for the meetings, but it does not anticipate failure to reach an agreement.
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native corporation from a foreign corporation. Second, is the conflict of source-of-
income jurisdiction. Third is the conflict between residence jurisdiction and
source-of-income jurisdiction. However, by adopting the Agreement on
Prevention of Double Taxation of Income, a framework has been put in place to
prevent it and to allay the fears of prospective investors regarding double
taxation.20)
Overall, the Agreement follows the format of the UN Model Tax Convention
and its contents are aimed at promoting investment in North Korea by reducing the
tax burden of South Korean companies. However, the Agreement assumes that the
process will always go smoothly, which is not the reality. In the event of a dispute,
the Agreement directs the parties to reach a consensus on the objection, but it is
doubtful whether a consensus can be reached every time. Furthermore, the
Agreement does not provide a contingency plan in the event a consensus cannot be
reached, raising the need to amend the Agreement to include such a provision. 
Although not an essential follow-up measure to the Agreement, it is also
worthwhile considering the issue of internal trade within a nation and the value-
added tax. The Enforcement Decree of the Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and
Cooperation treats goods and services supplied to the North as export goods and
services provided overseas (Clause 3, Article 51 of the Enforcement Decree) and
applies a zero-percent value-added tax rate on goods and services supplied to the
North. Meanwhile, goods and services from North Korea fall under the Value
Added Tax Act. In the case of goods, a value-added tax is to be collected by the
customs director in reference to the appropriate rate list, and in the case of services
Article 34 of the Value Added Tax Act is to be applied (Clause 1, Article 51 of the
Enforcement Decree). It is unclear whether this provision on levying a value-
added tax regards the entry of goods and services from North Korea as overseas
trade or domestic trade. However, considering that Clause 1-2, Article 53 of the
Enforcement Decree stipulates that supplying goods and services to North Korea
is export or commerce to earn foreign money, while the entry of goods from the
North is not considered as import, it is clear that import from and export to the
North is treated differently from import and export with other countries. 
However, if goods out are exports, goods in should be considered imports, and
20) See URL: http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/library/library.php?page_code=ue0501&ucd=eng0204&ewn_num
=66&mode=view&ispr=1.
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relevant agencies) designate a secretariat. Most likely the Korean Commercial
Arbitration Board will be designated as the secretariat for the South Korean side as
it has expertise and extensive experience in this field. 
5. Setting Arbitration Rules 
Article 3 of the Agreement on the Procedures to Resolve Inter-Korean
Commercial Disputes stipulates arbitration rules to be set at the Commercial
Arbitration Commission through mutual agreement between the two Koreas.
Using the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board,
arbitration rules should be proposed, reflecting the unique relationship between the
South and the North.19) In relation to this, Clause 4, Article 14 of the Agreement on
the Formation and Operation of a Commercial Arbitration Commission stipulates
that a draft of arbitration rules is to be exchanged within six months of the
Agreement taking effect. 
E. Follow-up Measures to the Agreement on Prevention of
Double Taxation of Income 
As South and North Korea’s tax systems are quite different, there is the
potential for double taxation of income generated from inter-Korean economic
cooperation. Jurisdiction on taxation, which causes double taxation, can be
disputed mainly in three situations: First is the conflict of residence jurisdiction,
which can arise because the two Koreas use different criteria to distinguish a
19) In preparing the proposal, not only advanced expertise such as years of experience in international
commercial arbitration but also the unique situation of inter-Korean relations, common types and characteristics of
commercial dispute between the South and the North, potential for resorting to arbitration in the event of a dispute
between the two Koreas and the possible contribution of arbitration should be considered. For details on a proposal
for inter-Korean commercial arbitration rules, refer to Chang Seung Hwa, “Key Issues and Direction of Setting the
Rules for Inter-Korean Commercial Arbitration”, and the Ministry of Unification, “The Direction for Resolving
Potential Commercial Disputes in Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation”, Materials for the 23rd Seminar of the
Special Committee for the Study of South and North Korea’s Statutes, (June 28, 2004), pp. 7-66.
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Korean economic cooperation, but also pushing forward the implementation of
other agreements made between the two Koreas. 
Many areas in the Four Major Agreements are incomplete, however, calling for
clarification through measures or even deletions of ambiguous clauses that could
cause snags in the course of implementation. At the same time, specific and
actionable follow-up measures must be introduced to enable actual
implementation of the agreements. 
For instance, of the Four Major Agreements, the Agreement on the Procedures
to Resolve Inter-Korean Commercial Disputes and the Agreement on the
Formation and Operation of a Commercial Arbitration Commission are ultimately
aimed at peacefully resolving disputes, so it is necessary to clearly define the
methods and procedures for concluding the resolution. The two agreements call
for a conclusion to be reached through consent between the involved parties.
While such an approach seems reasonable on the surface, it actually raises many
problems. In reality, arbitration in commercial disputes inevitably favors the home
country’s interests, and especially considering the unique dynamic between the
two Koreas, it is likely that most disputes will end in conflict or confrontation
rather then a consensus. Therefore, a realistic alternative is needed in the event the
parties fail to reach an agreement. 
Also, while the Agreement on Prevention of Double Taxation of Income
between the South and the North stipulates the scope and method for imposing
taxes and includes provisions to promote investment into North Korea, it only
vaguely states that objection petitions should be resolved through an agreement
between the South and North Korean authorities. In other words, there is no other
means to resort to if an agreement is not reached. 
Overall the four major agreements on inter-Korean economic cooperation do
not pose any serious hurdles, but issues such as legalities or missing institutional
mechanisms could arise in the course of actual implementation. In particular, the
agreements should provide alternative plans in the event consensus cannot be
reached on conflicting issues. 
Furthermore, to ensure the successful construction of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, international regulations such as the Wassenaar Arrangement should be
taken into consideration while trying to resolve issues concerning offering
collateral for funding required for the construction of plants in the area. Also a
comprehensive agreement on inter-Korean telecommunications and passage is
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conversely, if goods in are not import then goods out should not be treated as
exports. In other words, in the latter situation goods in and out are totally internal
trade, and therefore, goods and services provided to the North become subject to a
value-added tax. In this event the business operator (not the end user) in North
Korea will not be able to receive a deduction on the sales tax, raising the price of
the goods or services provided to the North. This appears to be the reason the
Enforcement Decree of the Action on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation
treats goods out as exports and applies a zero percent tax rate. However, such an
approach goes against the recent trend of regarding inter-Korean economic
exchange as internal trade within a nation, so it would be preferable to declare in
the Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation that economic exchanges
between the two Koreas be regarded as internal trade within a nation, and then try
to resolve issues on taxes including value-added tax through relevant tax laws such
as the National Tax Act. Also, the tax laws should have provisions to treat inter-
Korean trade as exceptions. 
In the case of a value-added tax, levying a significantly lower tax rate on goods
and services supplied to North Korea--as the former West Germany did in the
past--would be one way to treat inter-Korean trade as internal trade within a
nation. Meanwhile, on customs, Clause 2, Article 26 of the Act on Inter-Korean
Exchange and Cooperation stipulates that the Customs Act or any other legal
regulation on levying a tax on imports does not apply to goods from the North.
The Enforcement Decree of the Act also states that the levies, collections,
reductions and tax refunds on goods in or out is not applicable (Clause 3-1, Article
50 of the Enforcement Decree). In other words, unlike the regulation on value-
added tax, the Enforcement Decree treats the trade of goods originating from the
North as domestic trade and does not impose a duty or any other import tax. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The adoption of the four major inter-Korean agreements on economic
cooperation demonstrates that barriers to inter-Korean cooperation and building an
inter-Korean economic union can be wisely overcome through dialog and
cooperation. The faithful implementation and observance of the Four Major
Agreements is expected to have a positive effect, not only in stimulating inter-
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needed to stimulate inter-Korean economic cooperation following the signing of
the Agreement on the Entry/Departure Procedures and Duration of Stay in
Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. Kumgang. After identifying these issues,
South and North Korean authorities must move to establish follow-up measures
and agreements.
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Abstract
This article conducts an overview of the new Invention Act of North Korea and offers critical
comments. North Korea is realistically establishing the recovery of its economy as a national issue, and
is establishing and putting into practice systematic defense strategies for economic development. The
“powerful and prosperous country” theory being pursued by the Kim Jong Il regime has prioritized
economic development as a means for preserving the system. Among these, economic improvements
and development are being emphasized via enhancement of science and technology. Guidelines for the
close integration of the economy and science and technology were indicated as one of the means to
continuously implement the 5-year (2003-2007) Science and Technology Plan newly presented in the
National Science & Technology Congress held in Pyongyang on October 31, 2003. While adhering to
the principles of socialism, policies for improvement of economic management that pursue the
maximum benefit are being applied to the science and technology field.1)” The Invention Act was newly
promulgated, and this appears to be part of the movement deciding to adopt the Science and
Technology Act in the regular meeting of the Supreme People’s Council on December 15, 1988. This is
thought to be a necessary stage for economic recovery.
